ABSTRACT: The author highlights the paradoxical evolution of CJEU's case-law in the field of social rights and how in the past, it has played a praetorian role in a context of implied powers and modest EU primary legal provisions whereas now, it is showing clear self-restraint under explicit competences and an evolved EU primary law
of social systems), has its precedent in the opening provision of Chapter 1 ("Social Provisions") of Title III ("Social Policy") of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC), i.e. Article 117. 6 In truth, the 1957 TEEC contained few provisions on social policy, which were conceived closely related to two important goals: free competition and worker mobility.
In this regard, it has been noted that economic integration was the primary objective of the EEC and its predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the founding Treaties reflected this. 7 In this sense, even the Treaties establishing the ECSC in 1951 and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) in 1957, emphasized social policy more than the Treaty of Rome did. This is by virtue of the fact that they referred to specific industries (coal, steel, nuclear energy) and the ECSC and EAEC had strong social policy mandates to deal with the employment and health effects of these rapidly changing industries. The ECSC had funds to deal with redundant workers, and the EAEC was empowered to set health and safety standards.
Then, the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 gave a new impetus to several areas of social policy, especially in the working environment (as regards the health and safety of workers) and in the social dialogue (new Articles 118a and 118b TEEC). The SEA also introduced in its Preamble, the first reference to the 1961 European Social Charter in the founding Treaties. of "Union" -instead of "Community" -and "internal market" -instead of "common market"). 9 Indeed, social progress has been introduced asymmetrically (according to the view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion. To this end the Union and the Member States shall implement measures which take account of the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Union economy". They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of the internal market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for in the Treaties and from the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action". Unfortunately, the European social model has, once again, been challenged by the United Kingdom as a part of the "Brexit" vote. 
Social rights protection through the CJEU's praetorian caselaw
In theory, it might be argued that social rights were capable of benefiting from the initial CJEU's praetorian case-law according to which, without a written legal basis, European secondary law has also been developed in the field of safety and health at work on the explicit basis of Article 118a TEEC (introduced in the primary law through the SEA), to which Article 153 TFEU corresponds. This is the case and objective of Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992, on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding.
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Moreover, the EU has encouraged the collaboration of the Member States with the social partners in order to continue to address the problem of the continuing gender-based wage differentials and marked gender segregation on the labour market by means of flexible working time arrangements, which enable both men and women to combine family and work commitments more successfully. In this sense, part-time work constitutes a kind of a pilot situation in order to verify, as foreseen in Article 157(2) TFEU not only the specific "principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value" and, as a result, the combat against the gender pay gap, but also a broader framework ensuring "the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation".
From this perspective, the CJEU's case-law has dealt with specific controversies concerning the interpretation and application of the European Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC on 6 June 1997.
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The CJEU has also considered in breach of EU law the legislation of a Member State which requires a proportionally greater contribution period from part-time workers, the majority of whom are women, than from full-time workers for the former to qualify, if appropriate, for a contributory retirement pension in an amount reduced in proportion to the part-time nature of their work. 22 Obviously, EU secondary law has been capable of further developments in parallel to the extension of the "integration dynamics" to the social areas through the different "reforms of deepening" of the founding Treaties. Nevertheless, those Treaties left a partial vacuum in terms of social policy because goals were not matched with effective instruments 23 and this deficit has not been fully remedied yet. Indeed, in spite of the explicit distribution of competences between the EU and Member States through the Lisbon Treaty, a certain degree of ambiguity still appears when facing the concrete delimitation between European and National parameters to achieve the transversal social policy, insofar as the distinction between objective, competence and other related notions remains complex. which does not lead to binding EU legal acts, but just requires Member States to spread best practices and achieve greater convergence in the social field.
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The EP had alerted, even before the crisis, on the abusive use of soft-law instruments.
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As a result of this, the new scenario has also weakened the role of the CJEU and its case-law in the field of social rights. Consequently, one of the main challenges in this field is, from the CJEU's case-law perspective, to provide the national courts with more elements to give full effect to social rights by taking into account the potential tools which are already foreseen in EU primary law (for example, the "horizontal social clause" contract is terminated; iii) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers and iv) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory. From this perspective, the main qualitative difference between the Lisbon Treaty and the previous revisions (mainly, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty) is that the TFEU has extended the ordinary legislative procedure (former co-decision procedure) to those social fields. 33 In any case, putting into practice the Union action in these fields is very complex 
34
In EU language "social" also relates to employment policy, working conditions and labour law.
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Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2017 potential and different procedures and actors foreseen in Article 153 TFEU (Member States, European institutions and bodies as well as European social partners), but also because the boundary problems concerning the distributions of competences are evident in relation to social policy.
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As is well known, the Lisbon Strategy (agreed in the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 and targeted the year 2010) included, in the framework of a comprehensive approach, the promotion of the inclusion of people who suffer from poverty or social exclusion. Similarly, the EU 2020 Strategy (which came into effect on 17 June 2010 as the follow-up strategy to the Lisbon Strategy) has outlined, among the five strategic headline targets, two targets which are directly related to the labour market and social policies, namely; that the EU is to raise employment rates among men and women to 75 per cent and reduce the number of persons at risk of poverty and social exclusion by 20 million by the year 2020.
In this last regard, while Article 153(1), j, TFEU includes "the combating of social exclusion", Article 153(2) TFEU does not even mention this field among the potential actions and procedures to be undertaken. In other words, paragraph 2 of Article 153 TFEU does not paradoxically empower the EU institutions to take any measures towards the end established in its paragraph 1. How to compensate this intentional omission? On the one hand, it is clear that in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, Member States' local, regional and national authorities have a primary and major role to play in adopting initiatives to combat poverty and social exclusion. On the other hand, it is also evident that the combating of exclusion is not only one of the Union's social objectives according to Article 151 TFEU (in conjunction with Article 153 TFEU), but also one of the Union's main and general objectives set forth in Article 3 TEU, which refers to; "a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress" by adding that the EU "shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, (…) solidarity between generations (…)" (paragraph 3).
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As a result, Article 34 CFREU must also be taken into account by "institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity" and by "Member States" when they are implementing EU law (in accordance with Article 51 CFREU). In particular, paragraph 3 of Article 34 CFREU states that; "in order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance From this point of view, the adjective "social" may be applied not only to the specific Title X of the TFEU on "Social Policy", but also to Titles IX ("Employment), XII ("Education, Vocational Training, Youth and Sport") and XVIII ("Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion"). It must also be recalled that, before the Lisbon Treaty, social policy was included into a broader Title on "Social Policy, Education, Vocational Training and Youth" (Title VIII in the Maastricht Treaty and Title XI in both the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaties). In this sense, some authors have proposed a "human-developmental interpretation" of EU Primary Law which, should lead to the systematic promotion of social goals enshrined in the Treaty in connection with the CFREU. Their premise is that the EU is not based solely on objectives, and the notion of values appeared in the European discourse with the conclusion of the Constitutional Treaty, 37 which was has been "substantially rescued" on these matters by the Lisbon Treaty.
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From this perspective, those authors developed an evaluation of the CFREU, looking at the constitutional values underlying the Charter with the purpose of strengthening the social dimension vis-à-vis the conflicting economic objectives.
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Nonetheless, these authors seem to be much more in favour of another instrument (instead of EU Law and the CJEU's caselaw): the ECHR, supported by the ECtHR. 40 In my view, in spite of the self-restraint exercised by the CJEU in some social fields (and, especially, its reluctance to exploit the social rights recognised in the CFREU under the heading of 'solidarity'), the importance of the social case-law from the ECtHR cannot be exaggerated. In the field of combating poverty and social exclusion, without prejudice to several interesting judgments from Strasbourg, powers and modest EU primary legal provisions, whereas now, it is showing a clear self-restraint under explicit competences and an evolved EU primary law (including the CFREU). To face such a paradox, a more expansive judicial activism and opening to judicial dialogue may be traced in the sphere of social rights in order to avoid inconsistencies within the EU Charter, and thus with democratic legitimacy.
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In real terms, the social case-law from the CJEU has evolved and is undoubtedly valuable. In contrast, it has known a recent restrictive evolution in other fields covered by Article 153 TFEU and the CFREU, such as the workers' right to information and consultation within the undertaking (Article 27 CFREU) or protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30 CFREU). Furthermore, these two aspects have been assessed without taking into consideration the European Social Charter (and the interpretation by the European Committee of Social Rights) and, therefore, both have raised the issue of real or potential divergent views between the CJEU and the Committee.
In particular, concerning the right to information and consultation within the undertaking, the recent restricted approach (restriction contrary to the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón) is illustrated by case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, Judgment of 15 January 2014.
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By contrast, the same situation was analysed by the Committee under Article 21 of the Revised Social Charter and, also by taking into account EU law (even in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the CJEU, which is explicitly cited), it concluded that there was a breach of such provisions. (entailing a one-year probationary period during which the employer might freely terminate the contract without notice or compensation) introduced in Spain by Law 3/2012 of 6 July 2012 on urgent measures for labour market reform to face the economic crisis. For the CJEU, in spite of Article 30 CFREU, the situation at issue paradoxically did not fall within the scope of EU law.
Final thoughts: the necessary opening of the CJEU to the new framework of the European Pillar of Social Rights
The last two rulings from the CJEU (the Association de médiation sociale and Nisttahuz Poclava cases) reveal a restrictive position in relation to the CFREU (in particular to the workers' right to information and consultation within the undertaking -Article 27 -and to the protection in the event of unjustified dismissal -Article 30) and, at the same time, a reluctant approach to the more favourable standards in these fields under the European Social Charter and the interpretation from the European Committee of Social Rights. By contrast, the ECtHR has been more sensitive to establishing a judicial dialogue with the Committee.
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With this in mind, the consistency with these Council of Europe standards also demonstrates a controversial judicial strategy from the domestic courts which have submitted an unnecessary request for a preliminary ruling (since both national courts were entitled -and had-to exercise the conventionality control, by directly applying the Social Charter and the Committee's case-law) 48 and, in parallel, have made emerged contradictory solutions putting the credibility of the whole human rights European system at risk.
My constructive criticism leads to a clear conclusion, which is that the necessary opening of the CJEU to the new framework of the European Pillar of Social Rights, as part of the broader 'Turin process for the European Social Charter', through positive judicial willingness (by taking into account the synergies between the EU and the Council of Europe -including the case-law from the European Committee of Social Rights).
Indeed, the adjective "social" was explicitly added to the definition of the "European economic model" late in the primary law of the EU, particularly in the Lisbon Treaty, but it gave legally binding force to the CFREU, whose catalogue of social rights (especially those under the heading "Solidarity") have been precisely based on the European Social Charter of the Council of Europe. The latter, which reflects to a large extent the "European social model", has been ratified by all Member States of the EU (in most cases even before EU membership).
From this point of view, it is evident that normative interactions between the Social Charter and EU law are explicit. Firstly, the references to the Social Charter have been confirmed by the current sources of EU primary law after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Secondly, the links between the Social Charter and sources of EU secondary law are also important in both directions as well. 50 Finally, the Social Charter is also presented in significant non-binding instruments of the EU, precisely related to legal synergies between the Council of Europe and the EU.
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With such premises, regarding the establishment of coherent and harmonious relationships between the two normative systems (EU and Council of Europe) 52 in favour of the harmonization of the social models, it appears essential to positively exploit the "horizontal social clause" (Article 9 TFEU) as well as the social dimension of the CFREU (both at judicial 53 and non-judicial levels) 54 , without forgetting the EU accession to the European Social Charter 55 as a further step to complete the parallel accession to the ECHR. 56 However, these normative links appear to be more complex in practice. Actually, in contrast with the Bosphorus doctrine, This lack of presumption is very significant, in view of the overlapping membership of the European Union and the Council of Europe. From this point of view, the complexities of synergies are accentuated, since the European Committee of Social Rights is increasingly occupying a place next to the two European Courts (CJEU and the ECtHR) 62 in this area. 63 Nevertheless, overcoming such complexities depends on a simple human factor, that it to say, to promote a positive judicial willingness in order to exploit the favor libertatis or pro personae clauses (Articles 52(3) and 53 CFREU, Article 53 ECHR or Article 32 of the European Social Charter -Article H of the Revised Charter) through a sincere judicial dialogue at both horizontal (CJEU, ECtHR and European Committee of Social Rights) and vertical (with National Courts) levels (multi-level protection).
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Such mutual inter-action is of central importance to the development of social rights standards in constitutionalising the European Social model. Indeed, strengthening the synergies between the EU and the Council of Europe is, in my view, one of the key elements for the success of the new European Pillar of Social Rights, as part of the broader Turin process for the European Social Charter.
